The present study examined the effects of mood on trust in automation over time. Participants (N = 72) 
BACKGROUND
As defined in Kramer and Wentz [1] , cyberspace is a "domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, and exchange information via networked information systems and associated physical infrastructures" (p. 2). As it is intimately known by many, the internet is synonymous with cyberspace. Although the breadth of machine-tomachine connectivity is increasing, the two key aspects of cyberspace still boil down to human and machine. At some point, the human has a significant role to play, be it to create, interpret, or confirm the data. However, as with many human-machine interaction domains, there tends to be an overwhelming focus on technology-driven advances to the neglect of the human role in such domains. Consider the advances in automated decision-aids developed to assist human operators in complex task environments.
The underlying assumption is that automated aids will increase overall productivity; unfortunately that is not always the case [2] . A welldesigned automated aid is only useful to the extent that it is used appropriately. Often, the assumed performance improvements are not realized due to what Parasuraman and Riley [3] refer to as inappropriate automation reliance. In such cases, individuals either disuse (i.e., underutilization) or misuse (i.e., overly reliance or complacency) automation aids. Appropriate automation use ultimately depends on the users and the inextricable psychological processes that drive their behavior.
Trust in Cyberspace
Trust is a psychological process that has received attention in recent literature addressing use of automation aids [2, 4, 5, 6] and computer-mediated interactions such as virtual teams [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] . As with interpersonal interactions, when a degree of risk or vulnerability is involved, such as relying on a colleague or an automated aid to complete a task that is integral to personal performance, trust in the other becomes a significant guiding element in reliance and decision making involving the task. Thus, similar to humanhuman interaction, trust plays a significant role in humanmachine interaction [6, 13] . Across both, the bottom line is a human "interacting" in an environment characterized by risk, and therefore operating under the same guiding principles (cognitive and affective) that have evolved over eons. Trust, which incorporates both cognitive and affective processes [14, 15] , is defined as the acceptance of risk or vulnerability from others based on positive expectations [16] . Several significant findings regarding trust in relation to computers have emerged. Reduced trust is often found to characterize computer-mediated collaboration [7, 8, 11, 12] . Inappropriate reliance on automation, as related to trust, is another common finding that has emerged [2, 4, 13] . Although this growing literature base is adding to our basic understanding of trust in such environments, few researchers have expanded their findings to empirically examine additional individual differences that impact trust, and therefore have implications for understanding decision making in computer-mediated environments. Of notable exception is the work of Merritt and Ilgen [6] . The authors demonstrated that, above and beyond the effects of actual machine characteristics, individual perceptions of machine characteristics accounted for 52% of the variance in trust in automation.
Further, the authors found several individual differences that either moderated or mediated the relationship between trust and automation use: 1) the relationship between initial trust and automation use was mediated by the dispositional variable of propensity to trust, 2) extraversion was related to propensity to trust and moderated the relationship with automation use, and 3) trust assessments overtime represent qualitatively different constructs, with dispositional factors weighing more heavily on initial trust. The above research clearly demonstrates that numerous factors must be considered to truly understand how trust operates in these domains.
The Effects of Mood
As with any decision-making activity, there are individual differences or dispositional tendencies that can impact the trust process and result in surprising outcomes. Mood is one such factor that can play a significant role in trust, and therefore automation or system use. For example, given the problem of overreliance on automation [3] , mood can potentially exacerbate such effects by enhancing trust or the willingness to accept vulnerability or risk. Tomlinson and Mayer [15] suggested that, even when the source of emotion is distinct from the target being evaluated (e.g., the automated aid), emotions provide a psychological context in which judgments of trust and trustworthiness are made. Although the specific effects of mood on trust have not been empirically examined, a sizeable social psychological research base exists that supports mood effects on risk taking tendencies.
In general, positive moods increase acceptance of risk, whereas negative moods promote risk aversion [17, 18, 19, 20] . A prominent model in the area, the Affect Infusion Model [18] , suggests these effects occur due to biases in cognitive processing and information retrieval, prompting individuals to evaluate situations in a manner consistent with their current mood. For example, individuals in a positive mood are more likely to access information from preexisting knowledge structures that are associated with positive moods [17] . As these knowledge structures are associated with positive moods, the outcomes of the past situations tend to be positive, thereby focusing the individual on the potential of positive outcomes from accepting risk in the present situation.
Given the theoretical and empirical support for mood effects on risk tendencies, and the inherent link of risk to trust [16] , it is surprising that limited research has explored the influence of mood on trust. However, Forgas and East's [21] findings hint at a likely association. Investigating the ability to detect truthfulness in others, they found individuals in negative moods were more skeptical and detected deception more often than individuals in positive moods, whom Forgas and East suggested were more trusting. Whereas Forgas and East's study involved an indirect measure of trust, the present study investigated mood effects using direct assessments of trust.
The Present Study
As stated by Merritt and Ilgen [6] , "to more accurately predict, explain, and control user behavior, researchers must assess user perceptions and determine the factors that contribute to individual differences in perceptions of the same machine" (p. 207). Mood is the factor that we examined in the present study to determine potential effects on trust perceptions in an automated aid. Based on initial findings from an earlier study and the above literature, we expected individuals in positive moods to be more trusting relative to those in negative moods.
METHOD

Participants
A sample of 76 participants (75% male) from a Midwestern Air Force base participated in the study on a volunteer basis with no remuneration. The age distribution of the sample ranged from 18 to 66 (mean = 37). Due to minor computer malfunctions and other experimental issues resulting in data loss, the sample size available for analysis was 72 subjects.
Experimental Task
A modified version of the research platform Convoy Leader [22] was used as the experimental task in the present study. Convoy Leader is a computer-based task that simulates a convoy scenario. Participants were told they were the leader of a ground convoy team and were in charge of choosing the safer of two possible routes for their team to traverse. Participants were given three primary sources of information to base their decision: 1) a map display indicating historical hostile areas in relation to the two route options, 2) streaming sensor data informing the participant of the thermal, audio, and magnetic activity in four overlapping areas (2 sensor locations per route), and 3) an automated-decision aid that generated newly projected hostile areas based on realtime data which was displayed on the map and suggested a route at the end of the trial. Following a training phase including two practice trials, participants completed a total of nine, 3-minute trials, each of which presented two route options that involved varying levels of risk; the map, sensor data, and automated-aid were not always congruent in the assessment of threat. Of the nine trials, three were considered low vulnerability and the remaining six were high vulnerability. A low vulnerability condition was characterized by agreement between historical hostile areas on the map display and projected hostile areas by the automated-decision aid, indicating a clear safe route. In a high vulnerability condition, the historical hostile areas conflicted with the aid's projected areas, which forced the participant to trust either the historical map display or the automated aid. With the exception of the first trial, which was always low vulnerability to give participants a chance to get familiar with the task, the remaining vulnerability levels for trials were counterbalanced. Manipulation checks were created to ensure the varying levels of risk or vulnerability were perceived by the participants.
At the start of each trial, the two routes, previous hostile areas, and sensor locations were immediately visible on map display. Participants were able to interact with the sensor stations and review sensor data streams at will. However, during the last 10 seconds of the trial, the sensor station interactivity was disabled and the screen displayed a sign indicating the automated aid was performing its calculation for a route suggestion and the aid's route suggestion was then displayed. Similar to Merritt and Ilgen's [6] method, the automated aid represented weak situation strength, which allows individual difference to emerge. Individual differences would not emerge if the optimal route choice was obvious to participants, which occurs during strong situation strength: automated aid is either 100% accurate or below chance [4] . Only after the automated aid displayed a route suggestion were participants able to choose what they deemed to be the safest route; however, they did not have to follow the automated aid's suggestion. These weak situations are also likely those in which trust will have the most salient influence on behavior [23] .
Mood Induction
The International Affect Picture System (IAPS; [24] ) was used to induce mood during the training phase of the experiment. Twenty validated images (10 positive affect, 10 negative affect) selected from the IAPS image bank were incorporated in the training scenario along with a story relating the images to the convoy team the participant was in charge of. The combination of two standard mood induction methods (story and image) often increases the effectiveness of the induction (see [25, 26] for mood induction reviews). The story and images were intended to aid the participants in identifying with their virtual teammates, and therefore increase motivation and the sense of vulnerability associated with the scenario when teammates were at risk. Participants were randomly assigned to either a positive or negative mood induction condition. As reported in the results section, the mood induction was successful.
Measures
Mood Induction Manipulation Check
To ensure successful mood induction, the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; [27] ) was used to assess state affect prior to and after the participants were exposed to the mood induction images during the training phase. Responding on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from very slightly to extremely, participants completed a 10-item version of the PANAS. Five items assessed positive affect (interested, excited, enthusiastic, determined, and alert), and five items assessed negative affect (distressed, upset, irritable, nervous, and jittery). Although adequate internal consistency was found for the positive affect scale (baseline α = .74, post-mood induction α = .86), the negative affect scale did not achieve sufficient reliability until the items upset and irritable were removed, resulting in the following internal consistency reliabilities: baseline α = .70, post-mood induction α = .74. As reported in the results section, the mood induction was successful for the positive mood condition and marginally successful for the negative mood condition.
Vulnerability Manipulation Check
A 4-item measure was created for the present study to confirm the vulnerability manipulations were perceived by the participants. An example item was: "The route that was suggested for me to take was high risk." Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The measure was administered following each trial. The internal consistency reliabilities ranged from .89 -.97 across the nine post-trial assessments.
Trust
Trust in the automated system was assessed using 11 items from the scale developed by Bisantz and Seong [28] . In addition to general items assessing trust (e.g., "I can trust the system" and "I am wary of the system" -reversed scored), several items tapped Muir's [29] description of trust-related factors for automated tools (i.e., competence, responsibility, predictability, and dependability). Although Muir's factors are specific to automated tools, they resemble Mayer and colleagues [16] trustworthy indices of ability, integrity, and benevolence (see referenced articles for factor definitions). Example items include the following: "The system is reliable" and "The system is dependable." Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The measure was administered following each session of three consecutive trials, for a total of three trust measurements.
The internal consistency reliabilities were as follows: Session 1 α = .87, Session 2 α = .92, and Session 3 α = .92.
Procedure
Experimental sessions were held in an on-base laboratory, with each subject at separate computer stations. After obtaining informed consent, participants completed a background survey that included basic demographics, the baseline PANAS scale, and other relevant variables. Next, participants completed a short task training phase (approximately 20 minutes) that included a slide presentation describing the task in detail and two 3-minute practice trials. The mood induction images were included at the end of the slide presentation under the pretext of an introduction to the participant's (virtual) convoy teammates. At the conclusion of the training phase, participants completed another battery of surveys, including the post-mood induction PANAS scale, and then proceeded to complete the experimental task trials. Following the participants route choice at the conclusion of a trial, the vulnerability manipulation check was incorporated in the task under the pretext of a "planning debrief" report. The nine experimental trials were split into three sessions (three trials each), with the trust measure being completed at the end of each session.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Paired samples t tests on reported state affect before and after the mood induction indicated changes in mood in the expected direction.
Following the mood induction condition, participants in the positive condition reported significantly (p < .001) more positive moods (baseline M = 3.17, SD = 0.60; post-induction M = 3.51, SD = 0.75). The negative mood induction was only marginally significant (p = .09), although the change was in the expected direction, where higher scores denote stronger negative affect (baseline M = 1.31, SD = 0.32; postinduction M = 1.41, SD = 0.60).
To avoid experiment-wise error based on multiple comparisons, composite scores were created for low and high vulnerability trials.
A paired samples t test comparing low and high vulnerability scores indicated that the vulnerability manipulation was perceived by the participants. There was a significant increase (p < .001) in perceptions of vulnerability during the low vulnerability (M = 2.61, SD = 0.92) conditions (relative to the high vulnerability conditions (M = 4.45, SD = 0.82).
Mood Effects
Three separate univariate ANCOVAs, controlling for baseline affect as covariates, were conducted to examine the effect of mood condition on trust reports at the end of each experimental session. As expected, following the first session, participants in the positive mood condition 
Trust over Time
Using a repeated measures GLM procedure, controlling for baseline affect as covariates and mood condition as a between-subjects factor, results indicated that trust varied significantly over time (i.e., over the three sessions). Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ 2 (2) = 9.58, p < .01, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .87). There was a significant effect of trust over time: Table 1 displays post hoc analyses delineating the omnibus effect into the specific significant differences in trust over time.
Table 1. Mood and Trust Effects
Note. Means and standard errors are evident in Figure 1 .
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study provide empirical evidence for the dynamic and critical role of individual differences, specifically trust and mood, in understanding human-machine interaction. Consistent with findings presented by Merritt and Ilgen [6] , the present results suggest that not only is trust dynamic, but qualitatively different trust constructs emerge over time that show distinct relationships with other factors. The present research was the first to provide empirical evidence for mood as a key factor that is differentially related to these trust constructs.
Colquitt, Scott, and LePine [30] distinguish between trust (intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations), trustworthiness (assessment of trustee characteristics involving ability, integrity, and benevolence), and trust propensity (dispositional willingness to rely on others). The present research supports Merritt and Ilgen [6] findings that the trust construct can be further divided into dispositional trust and history-based trust, similar to what Mayer and colleagues [16] termed initial trust and trust developed following repeated interactions with the trustee. In the absence of interaction or knowledge of the trustee, initial trust is largely dependent on one's trust propensity, whereas history-based trust forms over time following interactions that allow the trustor to gauge the trustworthiness of the other [6, 16] . Going beyond the effects of dispositional trust propensity, the results of the present study indicate that an individual's current mood state can influence initial trust formation. Mood was related to trust only during Session 1, which represented initial trust as there was limited interaction with the automated aid. By Sessions 2 and 3, participants had ample interaction with the automated aid, and therefore ample opportunity to gauge the trustworthiness of the tool. Lee and See [5] stated that initial trust is guided by affective processes, whereas subsequent trust is more heavily influenced by analytical processes related to perceptions of machine performance (i.e., trustworthiness indicators). Our findings provide empirical evidence to substantiate this claim.
Although mood effects may not be as strong as they are for initial trust (something for future research to examine), Tomlinson and Mayer [15] outlined how emotions can impact subsequent trust as well. Incorporating Weiner's [31] causal attribution theory in understanding trust repair, Tomlinson and Mayer noted that both cognition and emotions drive the feedback loop that connects the outcomes of interactions back to the input provided by trustworthiness characteristics (see [16] for a detailed model). In other words, affective responses (e.g., anger, disappointment) to trust violations provide the psychological context in which subsequent trust is judged. However, the feedback loop indicates that trust will only decline if disconfirming evidence is perceived after some level of initial trust has been established. Furthermore, Merritt and Ilgen [6] found the greater the sense of violation (i.e., the higher the initial trust before expectations are violated), the greater damage to subsequent trust. Our results echo this finding. Overall, results indicated that participants' initial trust was lower during Session 1, but after repeated interactions and an opportunity to become more familiar with the task, participants' trust increased in Session 2. However, the automated aid was not always accurate in its route recommendation, which the participants likely picked up on more and more as time went by. Even though the automated aid failed at least once during the first and second session, such initial interactions, particularly in computer-based media, can be driven by an illusion of familiarity and understanding that is unwarranted and lead to inaccurate perceptions of trustworthiness [9] . However, participants likely began to develop more accurate perceptions of trustworthiness by Session 3, and there was a decline in trust. Interestingly, this decline was only significant for participants in the positive mood condition. These results extend Merritt 
Limitations and Future Research
Relative to the positive mood induction, the limited effectiveness for the negative mood induction was not surprising given findings in the literature investigating mood in non-clinical samples. The social psychological literature reports that most individuals approach situations with a positivity bias in attitude [32] , and baseline mood is often self-reported in a positive direction [25] . Furthermore, the use of the PANAS as the manipulation check may have truncated the results for negative affect. Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, and Tellegen [33] reported that negative affect scores on the PANAS remain relatively low in the absence of perceived threat or danger, whereas positive affect scores fluctuate widely throughout a normal day. The negative IAPS images likely did not present a strong enough sense of threat or danger to significantly increase negative affectivity as assessed by the PANAS. Noting the adjectives used for the positive affect scale (interested, excited, enthusiastic, determined, and alert) compared to negative affect (distressed, upset, irritable, nervous, and jittery), it is easy to see that more extreme situations than a computer-based task are likely required to elicit a greater negative response on this scale. Consistent with the current study, negative affective scores are positively skewed and leptokurtic (i.e., more peaked than a normal distribution) and cluster in a narrow range below the mean [33] . In contrast, PA scores tend towards a flatter distribution with substantial variability across a broad range [33] , therefore affording a greater probability of detecting effects. Future research should consider including multiple manipulation checks, including self-constructed rating scales that are task specific [25] . Westerman and colleagues [26] metaanalysis also concluded that informing participants of the intent to induce mood was among the most effective induction procedures, although this method was avoided in the present study due to concerns of potential response bias.
Clearly mood plays a significant role in the development of trust, however, future research is needed to further disentangle the effects over time. The present research provided strong empirical evidence for the impact of mood on initial trust, and results hinted at a likely, albeit more complicated, association with subsequent trust. Future research is needed that provides a deeper understanding for the mechanisms guiding the impact of mood along this trust continuum. Furthermore, measures of trust propensity and trustworthiness should be clearly operationalized and incorporated in addition to measures of trust. It is vital that mood is understood in the context of these two key trust-related variables if research is to clearly delineate the role of mood in the overall process of trust formation.
CONCLUSION
The primary intent of this study was to highlight the critical role the human plays in cyberspace. The human enters the cyberspace loop when he/she interacts with a machine, which is necessary at some point in the loop. Although there is a vast amount of literature to draw from regarding human-machine interaction, individual differences in this research base are rarely acknowledged. However, our results demonstrate that numerous individual differences play a role in human-machine interaction. Not all individuals trust the machines they are working with, which can lead to misuse or disuse [3] , thereby hampering the effectives of any cyber environment. The present study found that mood can exacerbate the effects of trust in such environments. Clearly, the role of individual differences in cyberspace cannot be ignored. However, a vast amount of future research in this area is needed if we are to develop the necessary commensurate understanding in line with what the technology advances have provided.
